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CHEVRON IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS:

THE CODEBOOK APPENDIX
Kent Barnett* & Christopher J. Walker**
For our empirical study on the use of Chevron deference 1 in the federal
courts of appeals, we utilized the following Codebook. 2 This Codebook
draws substantially from the codebook appended to William Eskridge and
Lauren Baer's pathbreaking study of administrative law's deference doctrines
at the Supreme Court. 3 Our research assistants and we followed the instructions below when coding judicial decisions. 4 To address questions as they
arose and to ensure consistent coding, we maintained close contact with
each other and our research assistants throughout the project and clarified
the Codebook to address additional issues. Further details concerning our
methodology (and its limitations) are further detailed elsewhere. 5
I.

BACKGROUND

Within each judicial decision, we separately coded entries for each issue
of statutory interpretation. For instance, if a decision considered three different agency interpretations of a statute that it administered (the meaning
of "reasonable," the meaning of "automobile," and the meaning of "large"),
we coded separate entries for each of the three interpretations.

Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.
Associate Professor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.
1.

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

2.
See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116
MICH. L. REV. 1 (2017) .
3.
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan,

96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1203-26 (2008) .
4.
The research assistants for this empirical study, to whom we are extremely grateful,
were: Morgan Allyn, Lydia Bolander, Megan Bracher, Greg Dick, Mathew Doney, Sidney
Eberhart, Lauren Farrar, JD Howard, Gregg Jacobson, Mariam Keramati, Patrick Leed, David
McGee, James Mee, Andrew Mikac, Justin Nelson, Meghna Rao, Rita Rochford, Serge
Rumyantsev, Kaile Sepnafski, Kyla Snow, Jonathan Stuart, Madison Troyer, Sonora Vanderberg-Jones and Molly Werhan.
5.

Barnett & Walker, supra note 2, at 21-27.
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Case Name
Year

If there is a panel opinion and an en bane opinion for the case, we coded
only the en bane opinion, but we added the citation and details of the panel
opinion in the Add'! Notes field.
Circuit
We used the following format to refer to the circuits: CAI, CA2, CA3 ...
CAl 1, CADC (D.C. Circuit), and CAFC (Federal Circuit).
Irrelevant Case
Because we sought to capture all cases that referred to Chevron during
our selected timeframe, there were a fair number of irrelevant decisions in
our database. For instance, numerous decisions concerned Chevron Corp. as
a party, not an agency's statutory interpretation. If the case did not involve a
court's review of an agency's interpretation of a statute that it administers,
we included a "1" in this box and did not fill out the rest of the coding for
this decision except for the Key Language from the opinion.
We marked as irrelevant decisions vacated by the courts of appeals. But
we coded decisions that the Supreme Court of the United States either affirmed, reversed, or vacated.
We marked cases as "2" if we were unable to code them accurately because the court was not clear about the nature of its revie~ or if the
three-judge panel did not have a rationale that commanded a majority.7
Where one issue was clearly that of statutory interpretation but the others
were unclear, we coded the clear issue without coding or remarking on the
others. 8
Authoring Judge
We inserted the last name and first initial of the authoring judge (e.g.,
"Cole, R."). We also identified "per curiam" decisions.
Panel Judges (1, 2, and 3).
We inserted the last name and first initial of each judge on the panel.

6.
See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln Mem. Hosp. v. Sebelius, 698 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 2012)
(referring to several judicial review standards but appearing to concentrate on arbitrary-andcapricious and substantial-evidence review).
7. See, e.g., Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, LLC v. USDA, 539 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
8. See, e.g., North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) .
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En Banc
We inserted "l" when the decision was decided en bane. If there was a
panel opinion and an en bane opinion for the same case, we coded only the
en bane decision and noted in the Add'l Notes the citation and details of the
panel opinion.
Dissent
We inserted the last name and first initial of the author of the dissent if
the dissent disagreed with the majority opinion as to the agency's interpretation of a statute that it administers. We included the key language or a summary of the dissenting argument in the Other Opinion Language column.
Other Opinions
We inserted the last name and first initial of the author(s) of any other
opinion, including any concurring opinions and any additional dissents as to
the agency's interpretation of a statute that it administers. We included the
key language or a summary of the additional argument in the Other Opinion
Language column.
IL

THE AGENCY'S INTERPRETATION

Agency
We identified the agency whose statutory interpretation the court reviewed based on the numerical assignments from Eskridge and Baer and additional numerical assignments that we included to ease coding. In coding
the relevant agency, we further followed the Eskridge and Baer methodology:
For agencies within larger executive departments (such as the Coast Guard
and the Army Corps of Engineers, both within the Department of Defense
(DOD)), the department rather than the specific agency was coded, with the
exception of the CIA, which has its own category. The residual category
was the Department of Justice, whose Solicitor General represents the federal government before the Court in almost all cases and whose staff routinely make policy-significant decisions that the agencies themselves
would not have made (and sometimes do not support).

Moreover, the ICC category also includes its successor, the Surface
Transportation Board.

9.

Eskridge & Baer, supra note 3, at 1204.

4
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Treasury = 0

Interior = 18

CFTC = 36

MSPB = 54

Copyright = 1

IRS = 19

Agriculture = 37

U.S. Trade
Representative = 55

DOD/Armed Forces = 2

Labor = 20

Commerce = 38

GSA = 56

DOJ = 3

NLRB = 21

HUD = 39

NASA = 57

Education = 4

OPM = 22

Veterans Admin. = 40

Fed. Marine Comm’n =
58

EEOC = 5

Patent & Trademarks =
23

Customs = 41

Fed. Credit Adm. = 59

Energy = 6

Pension Guar. = 24

FAA = 42

Adv. Council on Hist.
Preserv. = 60

EPA = 7

Post Office = 25

Nat’l R.R. Adj. Board = 43

Librarian of Congress =
61

FDIC = 8

President/White House =
26

Judicial Conference = 44

Nat’l Indian Gaming
Comm’n. = 62

Federal Reserve = 9

SEC = 27

Nat’l Mediation Bd. = 45

ATF = 63

FERC = 10

Sentencing = 28

Comptroller General = 46

Parole Comm’n = 64

FHLBB/FSLIC = 11

Transportation = 29

Social Security Admin. =
47

BOP = 65

FLRA = 12

Panama Canal Comm’n =
FMSHRC = 48
30

DEA = 66

FTC = 13

Dep’t of State = 31

CFPB = 49

Advocacy Training &
Tech. Assistance Ctr. =
67

FCC = 14

FEC = 32

Congressional Office of
Compliance = 50

Agriculture & Interior = 68

HHS = 15

Nuclear Reg. Comm’n =
33

ITC = 51

Treasury & Federal
Reserve = 69

STB = 16

FDA = 34

Small Business
Administration = 52

Education & HHS = 70

EOIR/BIA/DHS = 1710

CIA = 35

NTSB = 53

DOD GSA & NASA = 71

10.
DHS includes the U.S. Coast Guard's National Pollution Funds Center. See Buffalo
Marine Servs. Inc. v. Un ited States, 663 F.3d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 2011).
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Subject Matter
We indicated the subject matter of the interpretation based on the numerical assignments from Eskridge and Baer and additional numerical assignments that we included to ease coding.
Bankruptcy = 1

Health & Safety = 11

Education = 21

Business Regulation = 2

Immigration = 12

Foreign Affs/Nat’l Security = 22

Civil Rights = 3

Indian Affairs = 13

Housing = 23

Criminal Law = 4

IP = 14

Prisons = 24

Energy = 5

Collective Barg. / Labor = 15

Antidumping/Trade = 25

Entitlement Programs = 6

Maritime = 16

Postal = 26

Environment = 7

Pensions = 17

Agriculture = 27

Federal Government = 8

Tax = 18

Employment = 28

Fed. Jur. & Proc. = 9

Telecom = 19

Federal Lands = 10

Transportation = 20

I

Final Decisionmaker

1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=
=

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
Non-ALJ adjudicator
Appeals Panel/Board
Head of Agency (Secretary, Commission, etc.)
Other (Briefly describe other type of final decisionmaker)

When the court merely identified the position as that of the agency or a delagatee (aside from an administrative appellate tribunal), we coded the final
decisionmaker as the head of the agency.
Agency Interpretation

1 = Liberal
2 = Conservative
3 = Neutral or Mixed
We followed Eskridge and Baer's methodology (with our additions in brackets) in identifying the ideological valence of the agency interpretation:

I

6
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Interpretations were coded as liberal if the agency view favored the interests
of bankruptcy debtors, antitrust and securities plaintiffs, civil rights plaintiffs and other victims of discrimination (except claimants in "reverse discrimination" cases), criminal defendants, energy consumers, claimants
seeking information or entitlement benefits from the government, citizens
demanding environmental protection, plaintiffs seeking access to federal
courts, governmental and private employees, persons benefiting from
health/safety protections, immigrants, Native Americans, claimants opposing intellectual property interests, pension beneficiaries and state regulators
of pension funds, taxpayers, telecomm and transportation consumers,
[trade decisions that favored domestic industry, ]students and their parents
seeking educational benefits, and tenants.
Interpretations were coded as conservative if the agency view favored
the interests of bankruptcy creditors, antitrust and securities defendants, alleged discriminators in civil rights cases (except defendants in "reverse discrimination" cases), criminal prosecutors, energy companies, agencies
withholding information, government institutions paying for statutory entitlements, companies accused of polluting the environment or violating
business-regulating laws, defendants opposing access to federal courts,
governmental and private employers, defendants charged with violating
health/safety rules, officials opposing the rights of immigrants, state and
federal entities denying claims by Native Americans, holders of intellectual
property interests, pension funds and their managers, tax collectors, telecomm and transportation companies, [trade decisions that favored foreign
industry, ]schools and school boards, and landlords.
Interpretations were coded as neutral or mixed if the agency interpretation was liberal on one issue and conservative on another."

Agency Format

We indicated the process that the agency used to create statutory interpretation with the following options:

0 = Formal Rulemaking (very rare: must be “on the record” after
“agency hearing”)
1 = Informal Rulemaking (most common rulemaking: “notice and
comment”) 12

11. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 3, at 1205-06.
12. Informal rulemaking includes substantive rules that do not require notice and
comment, as well as procedural, interim, and temporary rules. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)-(B)
(2012).
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2 = Formal Adjudication (when there is an adversarial hearing/adjudication)
3 = Informal Interpretation (anything that does not fall into the above
three categories)
4 = FERC Proceedings (excluding notice-and-comment rulemaking)
5 = Unclear
Informal Interpretation
For those interpretations marked as "3" for Agency Format, we further
identified the type of informal interpretation with the following options:

Agency Litigation Position
Interpretative Rule or Similar Guidance
Agency Manual or Policy Statement
Agency/Solicitor General Amicus Brief
Letter/Revenue Ruling
Permit/Licensing Decision
Settlement
Arbitration Decision
Orders with notice-and-comment proceedings
Interpretations ansmg from rulemaking proceedings (in
comments, orders withdrawing rulemakings, etc.)
11 = Miscellaneous Informal Decisions
12 = Unclear
13 = Mixed (more than one informal format under review for the same
interpretation)
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 =

Continuity
We indicated the continuity (or lack thereof) of the agency's statutory
interpretation:

2

=
=
=

3

=

0
1

long-standing and fairly stable
evolving (agency had prior interpretation that was not consistent)
recent (new interpretation where no prior interpretation was
present)
not evident from opinion

Unlike Eskridge and Baer, 13 we did not look outside the court's opinion. Instead, we carefully evaluated whether the court commented on the continuity of the agency's position and considered the date of the regulation, agency
precedent on point, etc.

13.

Cf Eskridge & Baer, supra note 3, at 1206-08.

8
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If Evolving OR Recent, Because
For interpretations identified as "1" or "2" for Continuity, we identified
the reason for the agency's changed or new interpretation:
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

New issue for the agency
New administration
New or amended statute
Agency's practical experience
Agency found changed facts/technology
Agency's litigating position
Responding to judicial decisions or decisions from other tribunals
(e.g., WTO)
Unclear

If the reason for the agency's interpretation did not fall into these categories,
we coded the reason as "Other" and provided a brief description of the other
reason for the agency's evolving or recent interpretation.
Congressional Delegation Questioned
1 = Yes

Unlike Eskridge and Baer, 14 we did not look outside the court's opinion. Instead, we indicated whether the parties or the court questioned whether
Congress had delegated authority to the agency to interpret the statute at issue.
Ill. AGENCY ISSUES
Jurisdiction & Regulatory Authority
We inserted "l" if the statutory interpretation concerned the agency's
jurisdiction or authority to regulate. As set forth by Eskridge and Baer:
An agency interpretation was coded as relating to the agency's jurisdiction
or regulatory authority only if the agency was asserting (or denying) its own
power to regulate a whole category of conduct or activity.... In contrast, if
the agency were setting forth rules that regulated entities must follow or
clarifying a regulatory category, the interpretation was coded as not involving the agency's jurisdiction or regulatory authority. 15

14.
15.

See id. at 1209.
Id. at 1211-12.
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Regulation Interpretation
We inserted "l" if the statutory interpretation question at issue included
an agency's interpretation of its own regulation. Unlike Eskridge and Baer, 16
we did not look outside the court's opinion. Instead, we included "l" only
where the court mentioned that the agency interpreted not only the statute
but also the agency's regulation or other formal interpretation. As Eskridge
and Baer note, "If the [regulation] does not address the issue by its plain language, the brief typically represents the agency's interpretation of its own
[regulation]." 17
Preemption
We inserted "l" if the statutory interpretation involved federal preemption of state law.
Foreign Affairs
1
Immigration
2
National Security (outside of the immigration context)
3
Extraterritoriality (if the court mentioned "foreign affairs,"
extraterritoriality," "treaties," or related terms)
4
Antidumping
5
Other trade matters
6
Taxation of foreign citizens

IV. COURT'S DECISION
Decision
0 =
1 =
2 =

Overall
Liberal
Conservative
Neutral or Mixed

We applied the same criteria as in the Agency Interpretation field above.
Decision with regard to the Agency
0 = Case decided in favor of agency's interpretation
1 = Case decided against agency's interpretation
Outcome as to Statutory Interpretation Issue
0 = Petition denied/dismissed
1 = Petition granted or remanded and statutory interpretation issue
remanded to agency
16.
17.

Cf id. at 1211-12.
Id. at 1212.

10
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Petition granted or remanded but the court decided statutory interpretation question and thus did not allow agency to reconsider
the issue
Did not originate from agency proceeding
Other (petition dismissed or granted in part) (if other explain)

Chevron Step 0
We inserted "1" if the court concluded that the Chevron framework applied. Eskridge and Baer note:
Decisions are coded [ l] as applying the Chevron framework if the
Court cited Chevron or a Chevron precedent (Chemical Manufacturers, Cardoza-Fonseca, or K Mart) and then applied a deference
approach consistent with Chevron.
Decisions are coded as not applying the Chevron framework
when the Court cited Chevron or a Chevron precedent but announced that it need not decide whether Chevron applies .... [or
expressly decided that Chevron does not apply]. 18

Chevron Step 1
We inserted "1" if the court concluded that Congress has clearly addressed the issue. Eskridge and Baer note:
Decisions are coded as [l], Congress has clearly addressed the issue, when the Court announces that there is an answer dictated by
traditional sources of statutory meaning (statutory text, the whole
act, legislative history and purpose, judicial precedent, various
canons of statutory construction). It does not matter to the coding
scheme whether Congress's answer is the same as, or different
from , that of the agency.
Decisions are coded as [O or empty] , Congress has not clearly
addressed the issue, when the Court is unable to say for sure that
there is one answer dictated by traditional sources of statutory
meaning, as in Chevron itself. Thus, even when the Court believes
that the traditional sources provide somewhat more support for
one interpretation than another, but is not prepared to say that
the other interpretation is precluded, the decision is coded as [O
or empty], Congress has not clearly addressed the issue. 19

18.
19.

Id. at 1214-15.
Id. at 1215.
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If the court first determined that the statute was clear but then decided, in
the alternative, that the agency's interpretation was reasonable even if the
statute were ambiguous, we coded the interpretations as step-one interpretations.
Chevron Step 2
We inserted "1" if the court concluded that the agency's interpretation
was reasonable. We inserted "2" if the court concluded that the agency's interpretation was unreasonable. Eskridge and Baer note:
Decisions are coded as [l], the Court determines that the agency interpretation is reasonable, when the Court applies Chevron (Step 0), announces
that Congress has not clearly addressed the issue (Step 1), and says that the
agency interpretation prevails. It is implicit in such decisions that the Court
has made a judgment that the agency interpretation is "reasonable" for
Chevron purposes. And, of course, if the Court explicitly says the agency interpretation is reasonable (Step 2), then the decision is coded as [l]. 20

Deference Regime
We identified which type of deference framework, if any, the court ultimately applied to the agency's statutory interpretation:

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

=

no regime indicated, directly or indirectly
anti-deference (rule oflenity, presumptions against, etc.)
[omitted]
Skidmore or similar (agency expertise/power to persuade)
[omitted]
Chevron (need not defer to interpretation, only apply two-step
framework)
Seminole Rock/Auer (defer to agency's interpretation of its own
regulations)
Curtiss-Wright
(super-deference
concerning
foreign
affairs/national security)
no deference

Key Language
We pasted the key sentences from the opm1on that summarize the
court's review of the agency's statutory interpretation.
Other Opinion Language
We pasted key sentences from the dissenting or concurring opinions
that summarize those judges' views of the agency's statutory interpretation.

20.

Id.

12
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Notes
We included any other notes about the decisions-including quotations
from other opinions where helpful-that are not captured by the quoted
language in the previous two columns.
V.

REASONS CITED

For each category below, we coded "l" for reasons that the court expressly gave for upholding or rejecting the agency's interpretation.
Agency Expertise
We inserted "I" if the court justified upholding or rejecting the agency's
interpretation based on the agency's expertise or lack thereof.
Accountability
We inserted "l" if the court justified upholding or rejecting the agency's
interpretation based on the agency's democratic/political accountability or
lack thereof.
National Standard
We inserted "I" if the court justified upholding or rejecting the agency's
interpretation based on the desirability of having a national standard on the
interpretive question at issue.
Long-standing Interpretation
We inserted "I" if the court justified upholding or rejecting the agency's
interpretation based on the long-standing nature of the agency's interpretation or lack thereof.
Contemporaneous Interpretation
We inserted "l" if the court justified upholding or rejecting the agency's
interpretation based on the contemporaneous nature of the agency's interpretation or lack thereof.
Public Reliance
We inserted ''l" if the court justified upholding or rejecting the agency's
interpretation based on public reliance, or lack thereof, in the agency's interpretation.
Rulemaking Authority
We inserted "I" if the court justified upholding or rejecting the agency's
interpretation based on the agency's rulemaking authority or lack thereof.
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Agency Procedures

We inserted "1" if the court justified upholding or rejecting the agency's
interpretation based on the extent of the agency procedures (formal rulemaking, notice-and-comment rulemaking, formal adjudication procedures)
utilized, or not, in promulgating the agency's interpretation.
Congressional Acquiescence

We inserted "1" if the court justified upholding or rejecting the agency's
interpretation based on the congressional acquiescence/ratification/approval
or lack thereof.
VI. OTHER

Subsequent History

We checked Westlaw KeyCite to see whether the Supreme Court had
granted review or whether there was subsequent history in the court of appeals after an agency remand. If there was subsequent history, we briefly
noted (with citation) what the ultimate outcome was before the Supreme
Court or in the court of appeals after remand.

Needs Further Review
We included "l" if the interpretation needed further review due to questions about coding. We included "2" if the case merited further review because it may have been worth discussing in the body of the article.
Additional Notes
We included any additional notes about the interpretation or decisionincluding a panel decision where we coded the en bane decision - that may
have assisted in analyzing the cases.
Reviewer
We included the reviewer's initials for each case.

